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 A B S T R A C T  
In agency theory, a company, which separates the functions of governance and owner-
ship, is going to be susceptible to the agency conflicts. The arising agency conflict
causes the information, which is provided by manager becoming different or can be
manipulated. One of common practice done by manager is earning management, 
where earning management is an accounting policy choice conducted by the managers
for the variety of specific purposes. This study tries to reveal whether audit qualities
are able to reinforce the association between litigation risks to the earning management 
practice. Auditor litigation has 14 characteristics of companies being able to be auditor
litigation by calculating LITSCORE. Earnings management is proxied by The Modi-
fied Jones Model while audit quality is proxied by industry specialization. This study 
uses financial statements data of the manufacturing companies listed in Indonesia
Stock Exchange in 2010-2012. Analysis, which is used in this study, is the MRA 
(Moderated Regression Analysis). The results of this study suggest that there is influ-
ence between litigation risk to earnings management while audit quality as measured
by specialized auditors cannot strengthen relationship between litigation risk and
earnings management. This is because audit quality as measured by specialized audi-
tors did not show a strong relationship.  
 
  A B S T R A K  
Dalam teori keagenan, perusahaan, yang memisahkan fungsi pemerintahan dan ke-
pemilikan, akan menjadi rentan terhadap konflik keagenan. Konflik keagenan yang
timbul menyebabkan informasi yang disediakan oleh manajer menjadi berbeda atau
dapat dimanipulasi. Salah satu praktek umum yang dilakukan oleh manajer adalah
manajemen laba, di mana manajemen laba adalah pilihan kebijakan akuntansi yang
dilakukan oleh manajer untuk berbagai tujuan tertentu. Penelitian ini mencoba men-
gungkapkan apakah kualitas audit dapat memperkuat hubungan antara risiko litigasi
terhadap praktik manajemen laba. Auditor litigasi memiliki 14 karakteristik perusa-
haan yang mampu menjadi litigasi auditor dengan menghitung LITSCORE. Mana-
jemen laba diproksikan dengan Modified Jones Model sementara kualitas audit diprok-
sikan dengan spesialisasi industri. Penelitian ini menggunakan laporan keuangan
data perusahaan manufaktur yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia pada tahun 2010-
2012. Analisis yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini, adalah MRA (Moderated Re-
gression Analysis). Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa ada pengaruh antara
risiko litigasi dengan manajemen laba sedangkan kualitas audit yang diukur oleh
auditor khusus yang tidak dapat memperkuat hubungan antara risiko litigasi dan
manajemen laba. Hal ini karena kualitas audit yang diukur oleh auditor khusus tidak




Accrual accounting system as it existed in gener-
ally accepted accounting principles provide the 
opportunity for managers to make accounting 
considerations, which will give effect to the reve-
nue reported. In this case, the income can be ma-
nipulated through discretionary accruals (Gu-
manti 2000). Accrual earnings management will 
most likely attract the attention of auditors and 
regulators compared with the real decisions, such 
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as that linked it to the pricing and production. 
In addition managers who rely on accrual 
earnings management would be at risk if the ac-
tual year-end deficit between incomes that is not 
manipulated by the desired profit target exceeds 
the amount allowed to manipulate accruals after 
the end of the fiscal period (Roychowdhury 
2006). The target is not achieved is considered the 
manager does not have a good performance so 
that the opportunity will be lost even get com-
pensation could lead to the dismissal of manager. 
Furthermore, earnings management through 
real activity is defined as the deviation from 
normal operating activities of the company are 
motivated by management's desire to provide an 
incorrect understanding to stakeholders that cer-
tain financial reporting objectives have been 
achieved through the company's normal operat-
ing activities (Roychowdhury 2006). Earnings 
management through real activities differs sig-
nificantly from the accrual earnings management 
due to a direct impact on cash flow. 
Graham et al. (2005) survey found that man-
agement would prefer to manage earnings 
through real activities (eg, reducing discretionary 
spending or capital investment) rather than 
through the accrual policy in conducting earnings 
management. Earnings management is done 
through real activities and it is more difficult to 
detect because it is indistinguishable from optimal 
business decisions. Accrual earnings management 
is limited by generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples that encouraged management to manage 
earnings. 
Earnings management can lead to a decrease 
in the quality of financial statements for earnings 
management are likely to provide misleading 
information that users of financial statements 
(DeFond and Park 1997; Becker et al. 1998; and 
Hearly and Wahlen 1999 in Dahlan (2009)). In an 
effort to reduce the agency problem, it needs an 
independent party to bridge the conflict between 
the principal and the agent. Parties are inde-
pendent public accounting firm or an independ-
ent auditor. Auditing process is expected to re-
duce the mismatch between the information in 
the form of management and shareholders by 
using the other side are the auditor to certify the 
financial statements (DeAngelo 1981). 
The auditor is expected to provide a good 
quality audit by reducing the level of earnings 
management of a company. The user of informa-
tion will be more trusting on financial statements 
information that is provided by a credible audi-
tor. Credible auditors can provide better which is 
useful for users in decision making process. 
In the other side the audit quality is doubted 
because of the auditor involving in financial 
statements manipulation when the auditor doing 
audit process. Some manipulated financial scan-
dal were happend in a number of large a com-
pany in the world, like Enron, Worldcom, and 
Merck Co& Inc (Kusmayadi 2012). The cases of 
earning manipulation have wide impact on 
global money market. Enron scandal that was 
revealed in 2001 causing the decline of stock 
price drastically at many stock exchanges in the 
world. All these financial cases affected on public 
trust to integrity and credibility and auditor 
competence for minimizing the earning man-
agement practices (Sulistyanto 2008). 
The strict rule of law is needed for mini-
mized process of earning management practices. 
An auditor who is guilty in carrying out audit 
process gets lawsuits risk from third party like 
investor. Litigation risk was often happened in 
go public company. Litigation risk usually will 
be higher in the capital market with the good law 
enforcement application (Juanda 2007) 
Sun and Liu (2011) reveal that earnings qual-
ity will rise up or higher when the litigation risk 
is high. It proven that earnings management was 
affected by litigation risk, because the good earn-
ing quality reflected the existence of earnings 
management in the company. The good audit 
quality can affect management for not doing 
earnings management. Thus the audit quality 
becomes moderate variable on the relation of 
auditor litigation and earnings management. 
The threat of litigation encourages managers 
(agents) to disclose information. It is likely to 
lead to: (i) the disclosure of bad news immedi-
ately in the financial statements, (ii) delay the 
good news, (iii) selecting accounting policies 
tend to be conservative (Seetharaman et al. 2002). 
Environmental laws that apply to a particular 
region also have a significant impact on discre-
tionary policy managers in financial reporting 
(Ball et al. 1999 and 2000). Manager (agent) will 
perform a balancing between the costs of litiga-
tion that will arise with the benefits obtained due 
to aggressive accounting. The problems are 
raised as the following. 1) Is there any influence 
of litigation risk on earnings management?, 2) Is 
the quality of audit can strengthen the relation-
ship between litigation risk to earnings manage-
ment ? 
This research objective is 1) Empirically ex-
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amine the effect of litigation risk on earnings 
management; 2) Empirically examine whether 
the quality of audit can strengthen the relation-
ship between litigation risks to earnings man-
agement. 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPO-
THESIS 
Agency Theory 
Agency theory states that between management 
and owners have different interests (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). Enterprises that separate the 
functions of management and ownership will be 
susceptible to agency conflicts (Lambert 2001). In 
the agency model devised a system involving 
both sides, until the required contract between 
the owner (principal) and management (agent). 
In a deal, it is expected to maximize the util-
ity of the principal, and to satisfy and guarantee 
agency to receive the reward of enterprise for 
revenue management activities. Conflicts of in-
terest between the owners and management lies 
in the maximization of benefits (utility) of the 
owner (principal) with constraints (constraint) 
benefit (utility) and incentives that will be ac-
cepted by the management (agent). Due to differ-
ent interests often appear in conflict of interest 
between shareholders/owners (principal) with 
management (agent). 
Basically, agency theory is a model that is 
used to formulate the problem (conflict) between 
the management (agent) with the owner (princi-
pal). Principal-agent model can be depicted in 
Figure 1 (Lambert 2001). 
In the Figure 1 "s" is a function of compensa-
tion that will be the basis and form of the func-
tion that links performance measurement to 
compensate agents; "y" indicates a vector meas-
urement of performance under the contract. 
Based on the contract and the agent will select 
the activity or perform (an action "a"), which in-
cludes operational policies (operation decisions), 
the funding policy (financing decision), and the 
investment policy (investment decisions). Yet, 
the "x" indicates "outcomes" or results obtained 
by the company, and then used as a basis for per-




National Association of Certified Fraud Examin-
ers defines earnings management as accidental 
errors or omissions in the report regarding mate-
rial facts or misleading accounting data so that 
when all the information was used to make 
judgments that ultimately will lead to the person 
who reads it will replace or change an opinion or 
decision in Sulistyanto (2008). 
According to Scott view (2003:351), under-
standing the behavior of opportunistic earnings 
management as a manager to maximize their util-
ity in the face of the compensation contract, the 
contract money and political cost (opportunistic 
Earning Management), as well as looking at earn-
ings management Earning Efficient Management, 
where it shows that earnings management gives 
manager a flexibility to protect themselves and 
the company in anticipation of the market value 
of the contract. So that managers can influence 
the market value of the stock of his company to 
perform earnings management, both for income 




The users of financial statements stating that the 
quality of the audit in question happens if the 
auditor can give a guarantee whereby no mate-
rial misstatement (no material misstatements) or 
fraud (fraud) in the auditee financial statements. 
In the view of auditors, audit quality occurs 
when they work according to professional stan-
dards that exist, to assess the business risk audite 
with the aim to minimize the risk of litigation, 
can minimize dissatisfaction of auditee and keep 
the reputation of the auditor. 
De Angelo (1981) defines audit quality as the 
probability that an auditor discovered and re-
ported on the existence of a violation of his cli-
ent's accounting system. The probability of the 
discovery of a breach depends on the technical 
capabilities of the auditors and auditor inde-






 Contract s(x, y) Agent selects  Performance measures  Agent is paid s(x, y) 
 Agreed Upon  action (a)  (x, y, etc.) observed  Principal keeps x-s(x, y) 
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pendence. Some studies such as De Angelo 
(1981); Goldman & Barlev (1974); Nichols & Price 
(1976) is generally assumed that the expertise 
and independent auditors will be able to find a 
violation. This shows that the ability of auditors 
are supported by experience, level of profession-
alism can precisely determine the level of materi-
ality (Kartika 2010), so that the auditor can easily 
detect any violations. 
 
Litigation Risk 
The litigation risk is defined as the risk attached 
to the company, that allowing the litigation 
threat by parties who concerned with company 
felt aggrieved (Juanda 2007). Those parties are 
creditors, investors and regulator. Juanda (2007) 
disclosed that the litigation risk often be experi-
enced by go public companies, and could be 
measured by some financial indicator. 
The financial statements become the basis for 
the conduct of lawsuits. The financial reporting 
errors because of disobedience against standard 
and delay of negative information could lead the 
litigation demands by the interested parties. 
Boynton et al. (2002:169) provide ways to mini-
mize the risk of the auditor entangled in litiga-
tion: 
1. Using the engagement letter to all types of 
professional services. The letter will be the 
basis of a contractual agreement and mini-
mize the risk of misunderstanding about ser-
vices that have been agreed. 
2. Perform a thorough investigation into the 
prospective client. It is associated with a 
management that does not have integrity. 
3. More interested in quality service than 
growth. The ability of an accountant's office 
to determine accurately in an alliance is es-
sential for the quality of work produced. Ac-
ceptance of the new venture work with ob-
jects that will create the need for excessive 
overtime, on Normal workload, and lack of 
experienced professionals’ supervision 
should be rejected. 
4. Comply fully with the provisions of profes-
sionals. Compliance of the Statement on Au-
diting Standard (SAS) is important, so that 
the auditor must have the reason about pro-
viding any deviation. 
5. Acknowledging the limitations provision 
professional. The auditor should use profes-
sional judgment steady during the audit and 
the issuance of the financial statements. 
6. Establish and maintain a high standard of 
quality control. 
7. Pay attention to the prevention of the en-
gagement of the client's involvement in the 
financial trouble. 
8. Wary of audit risk because they contain im-




The Effect of Litigation Risk on Earnings Man-
agement 
Abbott (2006) suggests that auditors related to 
the magnitude of discretionary accruals in assess-
ing an auditor litigation risk. Litigation risk in-
herent in the auditor would make the auditor to 
be able to disclose the fraud committed by the 
management of a company. Auditors who have a 
high risk of litigation is expected to work better 
in exposing the manipulation of financial state-
ments so as to make the management in making 
earnings management will decrease. 
The size of litigation risks inherent in the 
company will be able to influence the behavior of 
encouragement or manager. Cao and Naraya-
moorthy (2005), Skinner (1997) in Juanda (2007) 
stated that the company would voluntarily con-
vey bad news information early will reduce the 
risk of litigation claims. It is also supported by 
Brown et al. (2004) who studied the effect of liti-
gation risk on management earnings forecasts, 
finding that the litigation risk is positively asso-
ciated with the likelihood of reveal forecasts re-
lating to bad news. Based on this description, the 
hypotheses of this study are as the following. 
H1: Litigation Risk affects Earnings Management. 
 
Effect of Audit Quality on the Relationship of 
Litigation Risk to Earnings Management 
Boynton et al. (2002:169) in Modern Auditing 
book, explains that to minimize risk entangled in 
litigation, the auditor should emphasis more on 
service quality rather than growth. In this case, 
the company’s ability to assign staff with the 
right to an engagement is essential to the quality 
of work. The acceptance of tasks with new busi-
ness object can cause excessive workload set lack 
of supervision of an experienced. This is sug-
gested by Boyton et al. that the firm refused the 
assignment. It can be analyzed that auditor’s 
specification is very important in terms of the 
assignment to be done, so the quality of the audit 
will be generated will become better. 
Luhgianto (2010) argues that the audit firm 
which having audit specialization in specific in-
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dustry has much knowledge of understanding 
certain environmental conditions. This condition 
may imply that the specialist audit firm will pro-
vide quality assurance audit higher than the firm 
that does not specialize. This is in contrast to the 
findings Luhgianto (2010) which states that the 
big four and specialist audit firms are not able to 
restrict the practice of earnings management in 
the auditee at the time of an IPO. 
Meutia (2004) stated that the higher audit 
quality possessed the lower earnings manage-
ment occurs in a company, so this study predicts 
that audit quality affects the relationship be-
tween litigation risk and earnings management. 
High litigation risk on auditors assumed to re-
duce earnings management, supported by good 
audit quality auditor may be assumed to reveal 
the presence of corporate earnings manipulation. 
Based on this, the hypothesis of this study is as 
the following. 
H2: Audit Quality affects the Relationship of 
Litigation Risk and Earnings Management. 
 
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
Research Approach 
This study examines the effect of litigation risk 
on earnings management with audit quality as a 
moderating variable. The approach of this re-
search is to use a quantitative approach to the 
Moderated Regression Analysis (MRA). 
 
Unit of Analysis, Population and Sample 
The unit of analysis in this study is the financial 
statements, while the entire population is a 
manufacturing company. Of the population, 
sampled in this study are all companies listed on 
the Stock Exchange in 2010-2012 in accordance 
with the characteristics expected of researchers’ 
sample (purposive sampling). The sampling cri-
teria, among others: 
1. Listed manufacturing companies active in 
Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2010-2012. 
2. The company has published/publish an an-
nual financial report (annual report) consecu-
tive complete and publish the complete au-
dited financial statements. 
3. Have a net Income. 
4. The Company does not undertake mergers or 
acquisitions during the period of the study, 
as it will affect the components of the finan-
cial statements as a measure of earnings 
management. 
Manufacturing companies were choosing be-
cause the kind of this industry is the most in In-
donesia, and has a different character than many 
other industries, so the researchers expect the re-
sults to describe the condition of Indonesian com-
panies in general. Years of research only 3 (three) 
years, assuming better reflect the reality of the last 
few years. 
 
Method of Data Collection, Data Types and 
Sources of Data 
The data was collected using literature study and 
documentation. Literature study is conducted by 
processing literature, journals, articles and other 
written media associated with this study, while 
the documentation is done by collecting docu-
mentary data sources that the financial state-
ments. 
The type of data in this study is secondary 
data in the form of financial statements in 2010-
2012, while the source of the data in this study is 




Operational Definition and Measurement of 
Variables 
Independent Variable (X1) 
Litigation risk is defined as the risk triggered by 
the inherent potential of the company relating to 
the failure to meet the interests of investors and 
creditors, where the fight for the rights of inves-
tors can only do litigation and lawsuits against 
the company 
Litigation risk was developed by Juanda 
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(component factor analysis) of the variables. (1) 
Beta stock and stock turnover volume, both of 
which are a proxy for the volatility of the stock, 
(2) liquidity and solvency , both of which are a 
proxy of financial risks, (3) the size of the com-
pany which is a proxy of the political risk. The 
stages of litigation risk measurement are as fol-
lows: 
1. Calculate BETA, share turnover (TURNOV), 
liquidity (LIK), leverage (LEV), firm size (UKR) 
by using formula: 
RETit = α + βRMit +e  (1) 
Description: 
RETit = share turnover of firm i at period t 
α = intercept/free risk return 
β = beta of firm share i at period t 
RMit = market return at period t 
TURNOVit = average share volume it / LBShit. (2) 
LIKit = Current Liabilities / Current Assets  (3) 
LEV it = Longterm Liabilities / Total Assets (4) 
UKRit = Log Natural Total Assets  (5) 
2. The five variables are composite by factor 
analysis to determine the index of the risk of liti-
gation. Higher index value indicates a high risk 
of litigation, and vice versa for a low index value 
 
Moderating Variable (X2) 
Audit quality is proxied by industry specialist 
auditors with services on certain area concentra-
tion. This specialist visits Determination of fre-
quency assignment KAP in conducting examina-
tions on its peers. Industry specialist has a market 
share of at least 20% of the total number of clients 
who received a particular industry group (Rusmin 
2010). Measurement of these variables using 
dummy variables, if the company is audited by 
specialist auditors then its value is 1, but if au-
dited by a non-specialist it is worth 0. This indus-
try specialist calculation was done by 6 (six) years 
data to see whether during this 6 (six) years the 
company often alternates the audit firms. The de-
termination of six years was chosen because ac-
cording to the government rules in Indonesia. 
Peraturan Menteri Keuangan (PMK) No. 
17/PMK.01/2008 stated that the company have to 
change the audit firm (auditor switching) at least 
for 6 (six) years in a row (Ministry of Finance Re-
public Indonesia 2008). For simplifying the calcu-
lations and does not cause confusion in calcula-
tion, example switching was done in the third 
years of six years so that the researcher added 
another years. A calculation that was used by the 
researchers is if they use the same audit firm for 4 
(four) years in a row, the company is audited by 
the specialist auditors, if less than 4 (four) years, 
the company is not audited by specialist auditors. 
 
Dependent Variable (Y) 
Earnings management is proxied by discretion-
ary accruals and is calculated by the Modified 
Jones Model, where this model are regarded as 
the best model in detecting earnings manage-
ment if be compared with other models and pro-
vide the most robust results (Dechow et al. 1995). 
The steps to calculate discretionary accruals 
as bellow: 
TA (total accrual) = Net income – Cash Flow from 
Operation (6) 
Tat/At-1=α1(1/At-1)+α2(ΔREVt/At-1)+α3(PPEt/At-
1) +e  (7) 
Description: 
At-1 = Total assets at period t-1 
ΔREVt = Change on revenue at period t 
PPEt = Property, Plan and Equipment 
α1, α2, α3 = Regression coefficient 
NDA=α1(1/At-1)+α2((ΔREVt-ΔRECt)/At-
1)+α3(PPEt/ At-1)  (8) 
Description: 
ΔRECt = Change in net receivable on period t 
Then, Discretionary accruals is calculated as: 
DACit = Tat/At-1 – NDA (9) 
Description: 
DACit = Discretionary accrual at period t 
NDA = Non discretionary accruals 
Discretionary accrual is a residual error (є) of 
the results of the above regression equation, or the 
difference between total accruals with nondiscre-
tionary accruals. In this case, the residuals are 
used as a proxy of earnings management. Compa-
nies with low discretionary accruals indicate 
lower levels of earnings management whereas if 
the values of discretionary accruals indicate 
higher levels of management in a high pass earn-
ings management. 
 
Data Analysis and Techniques 
Descriptive Analysis 
The descriptive analysis in this study aims to 
provide an overview of the study variables were 
observed. This descriptive analysis provides an 
overview or description of the data that is seen 
from the average value (mean), standard devia-
tion, variance, maximum, minimum, sum, range, 
kurtosis and skewness (Ghozali 2007:19). 
 
Data Analysis Techniques 
The research problems will be answered by 
adapted to the hypothesized model, which to test 
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the hypothesis of this study uses Moderated Re-
gression Analysis. This model determines the 
effect of moderating variable on Relationship of 
the independent variable and dependent vari-
able. Moderating variables are variables that 
strengthen or weaken the relationship of inde-
pendent variables on the dependent variable 
(Ghozali 2007). 
Independent variable in this study is Litiga-
tion Risk, while the dependent variable is Earn-
ing Management and the audit quality as moder-
ating variable. The analytical model in this study 
is described in the Figure 2. 
The type of mathematical equation is regres-
sion analysis with moderation analysis (Moder-
ated Regression Analysis) which is as the follow-
ing. 
1. Testing Model Equation of Hypothesis 1: 
Y = β1X1 + e. (10) 
2. Testing Model Equation of Hypothesis 2: 
Y = β2X1 + β3X2 + β4X1*X2 + e. (11) 
Description: 
X1  = Litigation Risk 
X2  = Audit Quality 
X1*X2 = Interaction between Litigation Risk and 
Earning Management 
Y  = Earning Management 
β1  = Coefficient of Simple Regression for test-
ing Hypothesis 1 
β4  = Coefficient of MRA for testing Hypothesis 
2 
e  = Error 
Table 1 
Litigation Risk Factor Analysis 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy .497 
Approx. Chi-Square 92.262 
Df 10 





DA Value Sample Percentage 
DA Negative 100 42,53 
DA Positive 74 57,47 
DA Null 0 0 
     Data Processed 
 
Table 3  
Effect of Earnings Management Regression against Listscore 
     Coeffiicients 
Model B Unstd. B Std. t Sig 
1 (Constant) 0.617  0.082 0.935 
X1 0.282 0.190 2.660 0.039 
X2 -30.373 -0.151 -1.967 0.051 
X1.X2 43.733 0.080 1.046 0.297 
    Dependent Variable: Y. 
Table 4 
Audit Quality 
Audit Firm Market Share 
Purwantono, Sarwoko & Sandjaja (E&Y) 31.03% 
Aryanto Amir Jusuf & Mawar (AAJ) 13.79% 
Osman Ramli Satrio & Rekan (Deloitte) 13.79% 
Haryanto Sahari & Rekan (PWC) 7.69% 
Mulyamin Sensi Suryanto (Moore Stephens) 6.89% 
Siddharta, Siddharta & Widjaja (KPMG) 5.17% 
Tanubrata Sutanto Sibarani (BDO) 5.17%  
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4. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Litigation risk factor analysis in Table 1 shows 
that Measures of Sampling Adequacy (MSA) 
value on each factor indicates the value of Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin - Measures of Sampling Adequacy 
(KMO-MSA) 0.497 or close to 0.5. The value of 
KMO and Bartlett's Test for correlations between 
the variables demanded is> 0.5. The significance 
of the study was 0.05. From the results above is 
obtained KMO value of 0.771, which means 
greater than 0.5. Meanwhile, the resulting signifi-
cance of Bartlett's Test of Sphericity was 0.059 
The results of the calculation of earnings 
management in manufactured companies that 
being sample of this study shows that the aver-
age value of the DA has a negative value. This 
indicates that the sample firms do earnings man-
agement with the pattern of decline in earnings 
management (income decreasing). 
Table 3 shows that there is significant effect of 
litigation risk to earnings management with sig-
nificant value below 0.039. This reveals that the 
risk of litigation owned by a company is able to 
make the management to reduce earnings man-
agement actions to perform. Based on Table 2 the 
value of earnings management companies manu-
facturing in 2010-2012 showed a negative DA val-
ues, which means that companies doing income 
decreasing. 
The result of the calculation of the quality 
audit is showed in Table 4. From the whole sam-
ples of manufacturing firms over the years 2010 
to 2012 showed that only Purwantono, Sarwoko 
& Sandjaja (E & Y) has a market share of 20% 
min. According to Rusmin (2010) who states that 
the firm that has min 20% market share indicates 
the specialist audit firm. From 58 companies 
there are 18 companies audited by Purwantono, 
Sarwoko & Sandjaja (E & Y) with a percentage of 
31.03%. 
The results indicate that the higher audit 
quality would be lower absolute discretionary 
accruals that occurred in the company. This is in 
line with research by Sun and Liu (2011) who 
found that high earnings management encourages 
litigation ex-post auditors higher. Khurana and 
Raman (2004) in Sun and Liu (2011) said that 
higher audit quality associated with the risk of 
litigation. The relationship between the qualities 
of auditors against profit management is also in 
line with research, Meutia (2004), found that the 
higher audit quality would be lower absolute dis-
cretionary accruals that occurred in the company 
but in this study showed no significant results. 
This is because audit quality as measured by in-
dustry specialization does not guarantee that the 
company is audited by a qualified audit firm. It is 
also seen in the analysis of data related to the 
change which is done by the researchers’ auditors 
where most companies audited by auditor same as 
those of different partners. This is done in order to 
avoid switching. 
 
5. CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION, SUGGES-
TION AND LIMITATION 
Conclusions of this research in answering 
problem statements above are: 
1. The influence between litigation risk on earn-
ing managements 
The result of this research states that hy-
pothesis 1 is accepted which there is an influ-
ence between litigation risk on earning man-
agement that was explained in sig. 0.02 
2. The quality of audit could strengthen the 
relationship between litigation risk and earn-
ings management. The results of this research 
stated that audit quality that is measured by 
specialized auditors could not strengthen the 
relationship between litigation risk and earn-
ings management supported sig. 0.244 Thus, 
hypothesis 2 is rejected. 
This research gives the implication: 
1. For the previous researcher in this study 
could add a reference in both terms of vari-
able and variable indicator mentioned. 
2. In addition as the reference, the previous 
researchers could use the stock beta value in-
formation in this research for the years 2009 – 
2011. This is because unavailability of stock 
beta data. 
This research has some limitations: 
1. The stock beta data for the years 2009-2011 is 
not available, so that the researchers had to 
calculate manually. 
2. Stock beta calculation in this research is done 
every month, because the limitation of re-
search time so for the next research, stock 
beta should be calculated every day for more 
accurate in stock beta result. 
3. This research did not include criteria for the 
companies which doing mergers / stock split, 
for the next research is expected could in-
clude these criteria in sampling so that calcu-
lation of earnings management is more pre-
cise. 
4. The next researcher can select some other 
measures for audit quality variables, not only 
by audit specialization indicator, but also by 
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other measurements. The next researcher can 
add the time for this kind of research. 
5. The calculation of earnings management that 
is conducted in this research still using the 
accrual earnings, so for the real earnings still 
not calculated yet. According to PSAK, the 
company has begun to be required to use real 
earnings since 2011. Due to this research be-
gan in 2009 and the presence of t-1 so that the 
earning calculation used by researcher still 
using the accrual earnings. 
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